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ENTRAPMENT
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976)
In Hampton v. United States, 'the Supreme Court
held in a five-to-three 2 decision that a defendant's
conviction for the sale of heroin, which he procured
from a government informer and sold to government
agents, was not barred by the defenses of entrapment
or denial of due process of law. A three-judge plural-
ity in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist held that
where the predisposition of the defendant to commit
the crime was established, and government agents
acted in concert with the defendant, not only is the
defense of entrapment unavailable, but also a viola-
tion of due process rights cannot properly be
claimed.' However, Justices Powell and Blackmun,
concurring in the judgement, refused to adopt the
plurality's per se rule. "The Hampton decision rein-
forced and extended the Court's 1973 pronounce-
ments on entrapment in United States v. Russell, '
which upheld conviction of a defendant who had
been supplied by government agents with a scarce,
though legally obtainable chemical used in the man-
ufacture of illegal drugs.
Charles Hampton was convicted in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri on two counts of distributing heroin. "The
charges grew out of two sales of heroin by Hampton
to agents of the Federal Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration (DEA), arranged by Jules Hutton, an
acquaintance of Hampton's and also a DEA inform-
1425 U.S. 484 (1976).
'Justice Rehnquist wrote a plurality opinion for himself,
Chief Justice Burger, and Justice White. Justice Powell,
joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred, while Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall dis-
sented. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.
'425 U.S. at 489-90.
"Id. at 491-95 (Powell & Blaekmun, JJ., concurring).
The concurrence believed that prior Court decisions had not
gone so far and that, since this case was controlled by those
prior decisions, the adoption of a per se rule was beyond the
scope of this case. See notes 57-61 infra and accompanying
text.
'411 U.S. 423 (1973).
'Hampton was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1)
(1970) which provides in relevant part:
[It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally-(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dis-
pense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distrib-
ute, or dispense, a controlled substance; ...
Heroin is classified as a controlled substance in 21 U.S.C.
§ 812 (c) Schedule I (b)(10) (1970).
ant. The events prior to the sales were in dispute.
According to Hampton, Hutton proposed a plan for
selling a non-narcotic compound closely resembling
heroin to gullible acquaintances of Hutton. Hampton
testified that Hutton supplied him with packets
containing the alleged "pollutants" which were in
fact real heroin; Hampton subsequently made two
sales to federal agents. Hutton testified that Hamp-
ton had initiated the plan to sell heroin and denied
giving Hampton the substances Hampton sold to the
DEA agents. Hutton claimed his only part in the
transaction was "finding" the buyer for Hampton.
At trial, Hampton requested a special entrapment
instruction; he argued that the jury must acquit him
if it found that the informant supplied the narcotics
to him, irrespective of his predisposition to commit
the offense charged. ' The trial court refused this
instruction; the jury was instructed to convict if it
found that the defendant knowingly and intentionally
committed the unlawful act charged.'
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit following his
conviction, Hampton argued that the trial court
erred in refusing to give his requested instruction on
entrapment. He contended that, notwithstanding
United States v. Russell, ' where the government
supplied the contraband, without which there would
be no crime, such government conduct constitutes a
basis for entrapment or "due process" defenses,
irrespective of predisposition. "The court of appeals
rejected this argument, holding that Russell fore-
closes consideration of any entrapment defense once
predisposition has been established. "
The "predisposition theory" has consistently
received a majority of the Supreme Court's support
'United States v. Hampton, 507 F.2d 832, 833 (8th Cir.
1974).
'The defendant did not request a standard entrapment
instruction, which directs the jury to acquit if it has a
reasonable doubt whether the defendant had the previous
intent to commit the offense and did so only because he was
induced or persuaded by some officer or agent of the
Government. See note 16 infra and accompanying text.
'411 U.S. 423 (1973).
"On appeal, defendant's counsel conceded that Hamp-
ton was predisposed to commit the offense. 507 F.2d at 836
n.5.
1507 F.2d at 835. The Court of Appeals noted that the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th
Cir. 1971) held that entrapment is established as a matter of
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in cases dealing with entrapment. 2 The theory was
first enunciated in Sorrells v. United States, " a case
involving a violation of the National Prohibition
Act. " The Court held that entrapment occurs when
"the criminal design originates with the officials of
the Government, and they implant in the mind of an
innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged
offense and induce its commission in order that they
may prosecute." " The test to determine the exist-
ence of entrapment was to be "subjective": Has the
government in fact induced the commission of the
crime by a person "otherwise innocent"? Did the
intent to commit the crime originate with the
government officials, or was the defendant "predis-
posed" to commit the offense? Was the defendant in
the case, under the attendant circumstances, initially
unwilling to commit the crime? " The Sorrells Court
justified the creation of the entrapment defense by
law to a charge of possessing or distributing contraband
where such contraband was supplied to the defendant by a
government agent or informant. The Fifth Circuit has also
held that the Bueno principle is not eroded by Russell.
United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974).
However, the Eighth Circuit chose to follow, in addition to
Russell, the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v.
McGrath, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974), holding the
defense of entrapment unavailable even in the context of
extensive government participation in an illegal counterfeit-
ing scheme, given the defendant's predisposition to commit
the crime.
"See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973);
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The "predisposition
theory" is also referred to as the "subjective test" and the
"origin of intent" theory.
"3287 U.S. 435 (1932).
"'The defendant had procured whiskey for a government
agent at the latter's repeated and persistent requests for
liquor to "take home to a friend," and by appealing to
mutual experiences as members of the same division in
World War I. Id. at 439-41.
"Id. at 442.
"Id. at 451. These questions are to be decided by the
jury in light of the circumstances of each case. Although the
subjective test considers the conduct of government officials
as relevant to a consideration of the circumstances sur-
rounding the commission of the crime, the primary empha-
sis is on determining the defendant's "predisposition." As
noted in the text accompanying notes 33-37 infra, one of
the major criticisms of this test is the difficulty and potential
prejudice involved in determining "predisposition." In
order to demonstrate criminal predisposition, the prosecu-
tor is allowed to introduce evidence of the defendant's
general character, past criminal convictions, rumored crim-
inal activities, and his reaction to the Government's offer.
See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45(2) (1961). Not only does
this evidence potentially prejudice the jury, but it also is not
really probative of the defendant's willingness to have
committed the crime, the professed object of the inquiry into
"predisposition." See, e.g., Donnelly, Judicial Control of
applying the traditional rule"7 that a statute should
not be interpreted to create an unjust or unreasona-
ble result. "Since the "origin of intent" to violate the
Prohibition Act was in the government officials, the
majority reasoned that Congress could not have
intended to include an entrapped defendant's conduct
within the purview of the criminal statute. "'
Twenty-six years later, in Sherman v. United
States, " the Court re-affirmed Sorrells' focus on the
defendant's predisposition in the context of the sale of
narcotics to a government agent. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Warren cited the Sorrells
concern with whether or not the intent to commit
criminal conduct originated with law enforcement
officials. " In attempting to clarify Sorrells, the Chief
Justice cautioned that in any entrapment situation, a
line must be drawn between the "trap for the unwary
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." 22
Only close scrutiny at trial will uncover the truth:
On the one hand, at trial the accused may examine
the conduct of the government agent; and on the other
hand, the accused will be subjected to an "appropriate
and searching inquiry into his own conduct and
predisposition" as bearing on his claim of innocence. "
The fact situation of Sherman led the Court to
conclude that the defendant clearly was induced by
the government informant24 and in fact never had a
Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs,
60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1108 (1951); Mikell, The Doctrine of
Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245,
251-52 (1942); Comment, Entrapment in the Federal
Courts, 1 U.S.F.L. REV. 177, 179-80 (1966). The Su-
preme Court has not specifically outlined the ingredients
which may or may not be considered in determining
predisposition, other than to say that it is a proper question
for the jury, and that evidence of prior convictions, without
more, is insufficient to show predisposition. See Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958).
"See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)
610, 628-33 (1818).
1287 U.S. at 446-49.
19Id. at 450-52.
20356 U.S. 369 (1958).251d. at 372.221d.
23 Id. at 373.
24Defendant was being treated for narcotics addiction;
only after repeated requests and pleadings from the inform-
ant did defendant acquiesce in a sale. The Court noted the
defendant's reluctance to become involved in the sale, as
well as his attempt to kick his narcotics addiction; his two
prior narcotics convictions, without more, were insufficient
to show predisposition. The facts of Sherman led the Chief
Justice to decry such government action which "plays on
the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into
committing crimes which he otherwise would not have
attempted." 356 U.S. at 375-76 (footnote omitted).
19761
predisposition to commit the crime. 25
The concurring Justices in both Sorrells and
Sherman2 proposed an alternative to the predisposi-
tion theory, focusing on the conduct of the govern-
ment officials in each case." Under this government
conduct test the relevant consideration is whether
the average law-abiding citizen would have been
induced to commit the crime by the tactics used by
the government. 28 The proponents of this objective
test reasoned that since the availability of the entrap-
ment defense depends on government involvement
in a crime, the proper focus is on the propriety of
government conduct. Behind this assertion is the
view that the entrapment defense is rooted, not in
some hypothetical intent of Congress, but instead
in the judiciary's inherent power to protect the
purity of the judicial process. 8 As Justice Roberts
saw it, "courts must be closed to the trial of a
crime instigated by the government's own agents." 3
The question of a defendant's predispo-
sition is thus irrelevant if the goal is to discourage im-
proper use of governmental power. " Instead, the
determination of whether a defendant is entrapped
should depend upon such factors as the setting in
which the inducement took place, the nature of the
crime, its secrecy and difficulty of detection, and
the manner in which the particular criminal business
is carried on. 32
The Sorrells and Sherman concurrences objected
to what they characterized as theoretical and practi-
cal problems of the subjective test. One is a problem
previously noted: the adherence to a hypothetical
Congressional "intent" not to punish entrapped
defendants for their conduct which, whether induced
or not, was violative of a federal statute. " In addi-
351d. at 376.
"Justices Roberts, Brandeis, and Stone concurred in
Sorrells; Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan, and Bren-
nan concurred in Sherman.
"This principal rival to the subjective test is known as
the government conduct theory, and is also referred to as
either the "objective test," or the "police conduct"
approach.
2 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 456-59 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
29356 U.S. at 381-85. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
30287 U.S. at 456-59 (Roberts, J., concurring).
"
11d. at 458; See 356 U.S. at 382.
12356 U.S. at 385. Justice Frankfurter felt that the
court, and not the jury, is the proper vehicle to analyze
these factors, since rules of law, rather than case-by-case
jury determinations, lend significant guidance for accept-
able future police conduct.
"See note 29 supra and accompanying text. If Congress'
tion, it is questionable whether a defendant's pre-
disposition can be ascertained accurately"' and
without prejudice to those with prior criminal
records or unsavory reputations. " Despite cau-
tionary jury instructions, the probability of con-
viction for prior activity remains substantial. 3
Equally important, the subjective test's focus on pre-
disposition could result in a variable standard
of police conduct, dependent on the target of
police solicitation. s"
In United States v. Russell, 3" the Court had the
opportunity to re-examine the two conflicting theor-
ies underlying the entrapment defense. Instead, the
Court relied on precedent to re-affirm the appro-
priateness of the subjective test. " While the ma-
jority conceded the existence of bona fide criticisms
of the subjective approach, they noted that similar
arguments had twice been rejected by the Court, in
Sorrells and Sherman. '8 Finding the objective test
intent were truly not to punish individuals who would not
have committed the crime without governmental induce-
ment, it is troubling that case law has held that similar
enticement by private citizens does not establish an entrap-
ment defense, even though such a defendant's act would be
no more blameworthy. See, e.g., Carbajal-Portillo v.
United States, 396 F.2d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 1968); Polski v.
United States, 33 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
280 U.S. 591 (1929).
3 See, e.g., Mikell, supra note 16, at 251-52.
"5287 U.S. at 356-59; see note 16 supra.3 6
/d.
"See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443-44
(1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 356 U.S. at 381-85
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); 287 U.S. at 456-59 (Rob-
erts, J., concurring). Police might go to greater extremes to
entice an individual with a criminal record and bad
reputation into violating the law, "confident that his record
or reputation itself will be enough to show that he was
predisposed to commit the offense anyway." 411 U.S. at
444 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
38411 U.S. 423 (1973). Russell was a five-to-four
decision, Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court, uphold-
ing a district court conviction of a defendant who had been
supplied by government agents with a legal, but difficult to
obtain chemical central to the manufacture of illegal
methamphetamine ("speed").
3 411 U.S. at 433-44. Justice Douglas, joined by justice
Brennan, and Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, wrote dissenting opinions in Russell. Justice
Douglas believed the government's conduct made it an
"active participant in the unlawful activity." Id. at 437
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart, espousing the
objective theory, believed as a matter of law that the
government conduct constituted entrapment. Id. at 439-50
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
"
0 The majority noted that at least equally cogent
criticism has been made of the concurring views in these
cases. In particular Justice Rehnquist found distasteful the
ENTRAPMENT [Vol. 67
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open to as much criticism as the subjective test, the
Court flatly declined to overrule long-standing prec-
edent and instead suggested that, since the claim is
not of constitutional dimension, Congress is the ap-
propriate body to "adopt any substantive definition
of the defense that it may find desirable." "Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reprimanded
several United States district courts and courts of ap-
peal for going beyond the Court's opinions in
Sorrells and Sherman in order to bar prosecutions
resulting from "overzealous law enforcement":
But the defense of entrapment enunciated in those
opinions was not intended to give the federal judiciary
a "chancellor's foot" veto over law enforcement prac-
tices of which it did not approve.... "
In addition to its consideration of the proper
theoretical bases of the entrapment defense, the
Russell Court dealt with an alternative claim that
was to be particularly important in the Hampton
decision: that the activities of law enforcement
officers in Russell were analogous to the "overzeal-
ous" conduct which had prompted adoption of the
exclusionary rule for evidence obtained by illegal
search and seizure"' and coerced confessions. ""Jus-
tice Rehnquist rejected the defendant's contention
that government conduct in supplying the legal
chemical necessary to the manufacture of an illegal
drug violated the fundamental principles of due
process:
Unlike the situations giving rise to the holdings in
Mapp and Miranda, the government's conduct here
violated no independent constitutional right of the
respondent. Nor did [the informant] violate any
federal statute or rule or commit any crime in
infiltrating the respondent's drug enterprise. "
The Russell Court conceded the possibility that
certain police conduct may violate due process
standards:
... [W]e may some day be presented with a
situation in which the conduct of law enforcement
agents is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking
objective approach's precluding, by virtue of a sole focus on
government conduct, the finding of guilt in a case where an
individual had himself planned and committed a crime,
notwithstanding the government's inducements. Id. at 434.
"Id. at 433.
"Id. at 435.
"See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
44See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4411 U.S. at 430.
judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf. Rochin u.
California, 342 U.S. 165 . ... 46
The Court concluded, however, that the supply of
an item of value to a drug ring as a means of gaining
the confidence of "illegal entrepreneurs" is both a
practical and permissible means of apprehension in
drug related offenses and not a violation of "funda-
mental fairness." "'
The acknowledgement in Russell of a possible due
process defense in the area of police solicitation of
crime provided an apparently logical basis for de-
fendant Hampton's appeal to the Supreme Court
after the Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction.
However, the Russell majority joined in the different
fact situation of Hampton t6 sustain the defendant's
conviction. Unlike Russell, there were two separate
opinions by the five Justices. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for Chief Justice Burger and Justice White,
interpreted his majority opinion in Russell as ruling
out the possibility that the defense of entrapment
could ever be based on governmental misconduct
where a defendant's predisposition was established. 4
Thus disposing of the narrow "entrapment" ques-
tion, Justice Rehnquist next considered the defend-
ant's constitutional contention that the police conduct
in this instance was that type of "outrageous"
activity, violative of due process, which even Russell
conceded could possibly operate to bar a conviction.
Justice Rehnquist indicated that, although the
government played a more significant role in ena-
bling Hampton to sell contraband than in Russell,
the difference was one of degree, not of kind. " In
both cases the government agents were acting in
concert with a defendant who was predisposed to
commit the crime:
The remedy of the criminal defendant with respect
to the acts of government agents, which ... are
encouraged by him, lies solely in the defense of
entrapment. But, as noted, petitioner's conceded pre-
disposition rendered this defense unavailable to him. "
"Id. at 431-32. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), police committed unlawful entry, battery, torture,
and false imprisonment in order to obtain evidence against
the defendant. 342 U.S. at 167. The Supreme Court
refused, on due process grounds, to admit the evidence
gained as a result of this conduct. Id. at 172. Justice
Rehnquist did not find the government conduct in Russell
analagous. See note 47 infra and accompanying text.
'7411 U.S. at 432.
48425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976).




Justice Rehnquist invoked his "chancellor's foot
veto" analogy as justification for the Court's
restraint in passing judgement on law enforcement
practices-an area where Congress has the primary
role. "'
To Justice Rehnquist, due process principles come
into play only when the governmental activity vio-
lates some protected right of the defendant, which
was not the case either here or in Russell. 52 Here
the police, the government informer, and the de-
fendant acted in concert. The remedy for illegal
police activity in such a situation lies "not in freeing
the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting
the police under the applicable provisions of state or
federal law." "
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, con-
curred to the extent that they rejected Hampton's
contention that it is a per se denial of due process
whenever the government supplies contraband to one
later prosecuted for trafficking in that contraband. "'
Justice Powell called the supplying of an essential
ingredient in the manufacture of an illegal drug, as
opposed to the supplying of the illegal drug itself, a
"distinction without a difference," and thus found
Russell controlling. The Justices objected, however,
to the remainder of the plurality opinion on the
ground that it "would unnecessarily reach and decide
difficult questions not before us." 5 5
Justices Powell and Blackmun's fundamental
"Id. at 490.
"Id.; see note 45 supra. An example of such a pro-
tected right would be an individual's right under the
fourth amendment to be free from unreasonable search and
seizures, as evidenced by Justice Rehnquist's reference to
the Mapp decision. See note 43 supra and accompanying
text.
11425 U.S. at 490. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 428-29 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 448,
503 (1974). In O'Shea, the Court denied injunctive relief to
residents of Cairo, Illinois who had brought a civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) against a magistrate
and a circuit court judge charging illegal bond-setting, sen-
tencing, and jury-fee practices in criminal cases. The Court
indicated that the proper remedy for judges who would
"willfully discriminate on the ground of race or otherwise
would willfully deprive the citizen of his constitutional
rights" is to be found in 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) which pro-
vides for fine or imprisonment for those acting under color
of state law to deprive persons of their civil rights. 414 U.S.
at 503. In Imbler, the Court declared that prosecutors of a
state are immune from liability in suits under § 1983 for
civil damages, but that this absolute grant of immunity from
civil suit need not leave the public powerless to deter mis-
conduct in view of the "criminal analogue of § 1983"-§
242 of Title 18. 424 U.S. at 428-29.
5'425 U.S. at 491.
55d.
objection to the plurality opinion was its enunciation
of a per se rule which, given the predisposition of a
defendant to commit the offense charged, precludes
any further inquiry into a possible violation of due
process, no matter how outrageous the police behav-
ior:
I do not understand Russell or earlier cases delineat-
ing the predisposition-focused defense of entrapment to
have gone so far, and there was no need for them to do
SO.56
Justice Powell stated his agreement that Russell
required an entrapment inquiry to focus solely
on predisposition, but refused to accept the entrap-
ment defense as necessarily the only doctrine relevant
to cases of government involvement in a crime. "To
support this view, Justice Powell cited with approval
Judge Friendly's opinion in United States v.
Archer 5 that there is a constitutional limit to
allowing government involvement in crime, espe-
cially if it involves injury to protected rights of
citizens.
The concurrence did not accept Justice Rehn-
quist's "chancellor's foot veto" reasoning; they did
not feel that Russell forecloses reliance on the Court's
supervisory power to bar conviction of a predisposed
defendant because of outrageous police conduct. "'
Russell indicated only that the Court should be
"extremely reluctant" to invoke the supervisory
power in such cases, but nevertheless should retain
the discretion to exercise this power. s0
"Id. at 492-93 (footnote omitted).
"Id. at 492 n.2 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
5486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973). In Archer,
government agents arranged a phony arrest of an informant
with the purpose of causing the bribery of an allegedly
corrupt state assistant district attorney. The government
scheme involved lying to a New York police officer and
perjury before New York judges and grand jurors. In
reversing the convictions under the Travel Act for illegal
use of telephone facilities in interstate commerce, the
Second Circuit relied on the narrow ground of insufficiency
of the evidence. However, the court made clear that it
considered the government conduct in the case beyond that
of any proper prosecutorial role:
The investigators apparently permitted their
deserved contempt for corrupt practitioners in the
Queens criminal justice system to spill over into
disdain for all the participants in the system . . . [this
conduct] is substantially more offensive than the
common cases where government agents induce the
sale of narcotics in order to make drug arrests.
Id. at 677.
"425 U.S. at 493-94.
"'Id. at 494. Justice Powell indicated in a footnote
that it would be a rare case in which proof of pre-
disposition was not dispositive. Police overinvolvement in
[Vol. 67
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Justices Powell and Blackmun were sympathetic
with the plurality's concern that the Court might find
it difficult to formulate standards of acceptable police
conduct should the supervisory power be used.
Nevertheless, they felt that the question was left open
in Russell, and, since Hampton was controlled
completely by Russell, the question remained open in
Hampton as well. The concurring Justices pointed
out that difficulties in defining limits on police
conduct do not themselves justify an absolute rule; in
appropriate circumstances, the Court must not be
bound by unbending rules that foreclose all judicial
discretion, and instead must apply principles of due
process to achieve a just result. "
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and
Marshall, dissented in the Hampton decision. Ini-
tially, the dissent paid allegiance to the "government
conduct" theory espoused by Justices Frankfurter
and Roberts in their concurrences in Sherman and
Sorrells. The dissent viewed the police conduct in
Hampton as "plainly" constituting entrapment as a
matter of law under this theory. 2 However, Justice
Brennan went on to delineate reasons why reversal
was mandated under the "predisposition theory" as
well. The dissent sought to distinguish the facts of
Russell from Hampton in two respects: (1) the
chemical supplied in Russell was not contraband;
and (2) the defendant in Russell was involved in
continuing illegal activity prior to, as well as after the
time the government agent participated in the scheme
of solicitation. 6 These distinctions, whether of
degree or of kind, require a different result:
Where the Government's agent deliberately sets up
the accused by supplying him with contraband and
then bringing him to another agent as a potential
purchaser, the Government's role has passed the point
of toleration. . . . [Tihis case is nothing less than an
instance of "the Government . . . seeking to punish
for an alleged offense which is the product of the
creative activity of its own officials . Sorrells v.
United States .... 6,
Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Powell's point
crime would have to reach "a demonstrable level of
outrageousness" before a conviction could be barred.
Furthermore, with respect to contraband cases such as
Russell and Hampton, this "outrageousness" would be
difficult to show since such offenses necessarily and justi-
fiably involve undercover government involvement. Id. at
495-96, n.7.611d. at 494-95 nn. 5,6.621d. at 497 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
"I1d. at 497-98.
6 1d. at 498-99.
that Russell permits imposition of a bar to convic-
tion; notwithstanding the existence of a predisposed
defendant, where conduct of police is sufficiently
offensive. Examining the instant case, Justice Bren-
nan concluded that the police activity went beyond
permissible limits. To prevent these abuses of
police power, the dissent suggested an expansion of
the entrapment defense, under the aegis of the
Court's supervisory power, to bar as a matter of law
convictions where the subject of the criminal charge
is the sale of contraband provided to the defendant by
a government agent. 6e
Hampton firmly establishes the Court's unwilling-
ness to reconsider the "subjective versus objective"
dialogue as to the appropriate basis of the entrap-
ment doctrine. Clearly, the Court is determined to
limit the entrapment defense to a predisposition-
focused concept, in spite of the many theoretical and
practical criticisms of this approach. 6 Though the
Court is clear and consistent in its support of the
predisposition theory, it is both unclear and incon-
sistent on the question of a due process defense raised
by the same majority in Russell. 68 The principal
problem with the Hampton decision is that it
effectively renders the "outrageous conduct" excep-
tion meaningless, at least in the context of drug-re-
lated offenses. In the plurality opinion, Justice
Rehnquist conceded that the government played a
more significant role in enabling the defendant to
sell contraband than in Russell. He would justify
this by asserting that the government and the de-
fendant acted "in concert," and thus no constitu-
tional right of the defendant was infringed. 6 How-
ever, in Russell, Justice Rehnquist justified the gov-
ernment conduct not only because it "violated no
independent constitutional right" of the defendant,
but also because the government informer did not
"violate any federal statute or rule or commit any
crime in infiltrating the respondent's drug enter-
prise." 70 It is questionable whether the same may
"
5Id. at 497. Brennan disputed the necessity of supply-
ing contraband to catch participants in drug traffic. He
noted that if the police believe an individual is a distributor
of narcotics, all that is required is to set up a "buy": "the
putative pusher is worth the investigative effort only if he
has ready access to a supply." Id. at 499-500 n.3.
661d. at 500 n.4. See United States v. Morley, 496
F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.), aff'd mem., 505 F.2d 1251 (1974).
United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973);
"'See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
6See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
69425 U.S. at 490-91.
70411 U.S. at 430.
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be said of the conduct in Hampton. If the partici-
pants were indeed acting in concert, as Justice
Rehnquist concludes, then the transaction must be
viewed, in the words of Justice Brennan, as "the
Government... doing nothing less than buying
contraband from itself through an intermediary and
jailing the intermediary." 71 Furthermore, if the ex-
clusionary rule is predicated on the failure of the
government to observe its own laws, as Justice
Rehnquist contends in Russell, 72 it logically follows
that government law-breaking in the buying and
selling of heroin-even to catch a "predisposed"
intermediary-should be considered sufficiently
"outrageous" conduct to invoke "due process prin-
ciples [to] absolutely bar the Government from in-
voking judicial processes to obtain a conviction." 73
One possible explanation for the majority's unwil-
lingness to follow its own reasoning in Russell to its
logical conclusion in Hampton may be a feeling that
courts should be hesitant to use the broad authority
of the due process clause to bar prosecution, rather
than just the introduction of evidence, on the basis of
unlawful police conduct. "' Underlying the Court's
decisions in both Russell and Hampton is also a
belief that government solicitation is a necessary
police tactic against illegal drug traffic. "
Whatever its underlying motives, the majority
opinions in Hampton effectively emasculate a possi-
ble "outrageous conduct"-due process defense, at
least in the context of drug-related cases. For the
plurality, Justice Rehnquist enunciates, without a
single supporting authority, a new per se rule which
in substance renders due process principles inappli-
cable for a predisposed defendant. 7 Secondly, under
the guise of separation of powers, he argues that the
Court may not exercise a "chancellor's foot veto"
over those law enforcement activities which it did not
71425 U.S. at 498 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
"See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
73411 U.S. at 430-32. Many commentators agree that
the exclusionary rule analogy should extend to extensive
government participation in a crime. See, e.g., Donnelly,
supra note 16 at 1112; Comment, The Serpent Beguiled
Me and I Did Eat: The Constitutional Status of The
Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942,-949-50 (1965).
"See note 40 supra. While courts exercise a tradition-
ally broad power over the admission of evidence, they risk
infringement of executive and legislative powers when they
release a defendant found guilty on the basis of permissible
evidence. See Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1333,
1334 (1960).
7 5See 411 U.S. at 432; Rotenberg, The Police
Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L.
Ray. 871, 875 (1963).
76425 U.S. at 488-91.
approve. 7 Finally, Justice Rehnquist suggests that
in those instances where police do engage in illegal
activity beyond the scope of their duties, the remedy
of the "equally culpable" defendant lies in the
process of "prosecuting the police under the applic-
able provisions of state or federal law." " In short,
the defendant's due process rights reserved in Rus-
sell are scarcely to be seen in the Hampton plurality.
What is left is the citation to Rochin, and if the facts
of this case indicate how outrageous police conduct
must be before due process is denied to a defend-
ant, the defense offers negligible protection beyond
that already afforded by the exclusionary rule. "
Nor is the concurrence helpful in salvaging the due
process defense. Justices Powell and Blackmun at
least initially take exception to the plurality's pro-
nouncements on "difficult questions not before us,"
and caution against, in the words of Justice Frank-
furter, 8 the risk of shrinking the Court's responsibil-
ity to "accommodate the dangers of overzealous law
enforcement and civilized methods adequate to
counter the ingenuity of modern criminals." "5 Yet
Justices Powell and Blackmun, too, see no "outra-
geous conduct" in the government's scheme. Though
they apparently recognize, without elaborating, some
circumstances where due process or the Court's
supervisory power may bar conviction of a predis-
posed defendant, " they conclude that:
[Tihe cases, if any, in which proof of predisposition
is not dispositive will be rare. Police overinvolvement
in crime would have to reach a demonstrable level of
outrageousness before it could bar a conviction. This
would be especially difficult to show with respect to
contraband offenses, which are so difficult to detect in
the absence of undercover government involvement. "
The concurrence thus fails, as the dissent points
out, to distinguish between the levels of government
71d. at 490.
"I1d.; see note 53 supra. It is ironic that Justice
Rehnquist would recommend this remedy and then write
the opinion for the Court in a case which makes it harder to
pursue such a course of action. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362 (1976). The impracticality of a judicial remedy
against police abuse following Rizzo is discussed in
Comment, Rethinking Federal Injunctive Relief Against
Police Abuse: Picking up the Pieces After Rizzo v.
Goode, 7 Rur.-CAN1. L.J., 530 (1976).
"See notes 40, 43, and 44 supra, and accompanying
text.
"
5Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 381 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"Id. at 381.
"See note 46 supra.




involvement in Russell and Hampton. While supply-
ing a legal ingredient in the manufacture of "speed"
is arguably "necessary" to catch participants in
illegal drug traffic, the supplying of contraband is
not:
If the police believe an individual is a distributor of
narcotics, all that is required is to set up a "buy"; the
putative pusher is worth the investigative effort only if
he has ready access to a supply. "
While law enforcement officials must be allowed
sufficient discretion to effectively counter narcotics
traffic, " actions which involve government law-
breaking can hardly be deemed consistent with
fundamental fairness in the judicial process. 86
By refusing to hold government conduct in procur-
ing contraband for a predisposed defendant and
arranging its sale to undercover agents as an entrap-
ment or a denial of due process, the Burger Court in
Hampton has again shown its desire to avoid adding
restraints on police apprehension and conviction of
"Id. at 499 n.3.
"Id. at 495-96 n.7.
"See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
those clearly guilty of a crime. "7 An exclusionary-
type rule, aimed at ending unlawful police behavior,
is again avoided where the result would be to free the
"equally culpable" defendant; instead, police con-
duct is left to regulation by state or federal law, "8or
by external review procedures. 9 Though Hampton
stopped short of explicitly making the existence of a
defendant's predisposition an absolute bar to the
invocation of a due process defense, such a defense
will be all but impossible to establish in future
contraband-related cases. 9' Hampton will undoubt-
edly be a welcome addition to the tools of law
enforcement officials in the battle against narcotics
traffic. It remains to be seen whether the Court's
emasculation of the Russell "outrageous conduct"
caveat will unleash, in Justice Frankfurter's words,
the "dangers of overzealous law enforcement,"
resulting, in the final analysis, in a loss of freedom for
every individual.
8See Hartman, The Burger Court, 1973 Term: Leav-
ing the Sixties Behind Us, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 437 (1974).
"See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
"Chief Justice Burger has suggested establishing a
civilian review board as an independent external measure to
combat excesses of police ictivity. See Burger, Who Will
Watch the Watchman? 14 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 9-23 (1964).
"See note 60 supra.
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